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Abstract: While extensive research addresses the problem of establishing session keys through
cryptographic protocols, relatively little work has appeared addressing the problem of revocation
and update of long term keys. We present an API for symmetric key management on embedded
devices that supports revocation and prove security properties design in the symbolic model of
cryptography. Our API supports two modes of revocation: a passive mode where keys have an
expiration time, and an active mode where revocation messages are sent to devices. For the first
we show that once enough time has elapsed after the compromise of a key, the system returns to
a secure state, i.e. the API is robust against attempts by the attacker to use a compromised key
to compromise other keys or keep the compromised key alive past its validity time. For the second
we show that once revocation messages have been received the system is immediately in a secure
state. Notable features of our designs are that all secret values on the device are revocable, and
the device returns to a functionally equivalent state after revocation is complete.
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Révoquer et laisser vivre :
Une API sécurisée avec révocation de clefs.
Résumé : De nombreuses recherches traitent du problème de l’établissement
de clefs de session à l’aide de protocoles cryptographiques. Inversement, il y a eu
relativement peu de travaux concernant le problème de la révocation et la mise
à jour de clefs à longue durée de vie. Nous présentons une API, pour la gestion
de clefs symétriques sur des systèmes embarqués, qui supporte la révocation et
nous démontrons ses propriétés de sécurité dans le modèle symbolique. Notre
API permet deux modes de révocation : le premier, passif, se base sur une durée
de vie limitée attribuée aux clefs et le second, actif, envoie des instructions de
révocation de clef aux différents dispositifs.
Notre premier résultat démontre que, lorsqu’une clef est compromise, le sys-
tème retourne, après un certain temps, dans un état sécurisé, c.à.d. un état où
les API’s respectent la politique de sécurité. Le second résultat montre, qu’une
fois les messages de révocation réceptionnés, les appareils retournent immédi-
atement dans un état sécurisé. Les particularités principales de notre schéma
sont que tous les secrets contenus dans un appareil sont révocables et, qu’après
révocation, l’appareil retourne dans un état fonctionnel.
Mots-clés : api, méthodes formelles, révocation
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1 Introduction
Embedded systems deployed in hostile environments often employ some dedi-
cated tamper-resistant secure hardware to handle cryptographic operations and
keep keys secure. Examples include mobile phones (which contain SIM cards),
smartphones (recent models include ‘Secure Elements’), public transport ticket-
ing systems (such as the Calypso system which employs smartcards and ‘SAM’
modules [10]), smart utility meters (that include a smartcard-like chip for cryp-
tography), on-vehicle cryptographic devices to support vehicle-to-vehicle net-
working [16] et cetera. In such systems, it is often necessary to support the
possibility of remotely revoking and updating the long-term keys on the device.
However, while extensive research addresses the problem of establishing a new
session key or determining what security properties can be guaranteed in the
event of long-term key corruption, relatively little work has appeared addressing
the problem of revocation and update of long-term keys.
Most existing solutions for key revocation follow one of two approaches:
either key revocation actually relies on some ‘longer term’ key that cannot be
itself revoked, or key revocation is simply achieved by disabling, resetting or
isolating the compromised device. For many applications, both these approaches
are unsatisfactory. We propose that a key revocation API should ideally satisfy
the following properties:
1. The device should remain functional - specifically, whenever possible, the
device should return to an equivalent functional state after revocation (but
with fresh keys in place).
2. Any key should be revocable - side-channel attacks may compromise (per-
haps with significant effort) any of the keys stored on a cryptographic
device, and the more sensitive a key is, the more likely an attacker is to
dedicate effort to breaking it. Hence it is not prudent to decide in advance
which keys may or may not be compromised.
The first main contribution of this paper is the design of an API with up-
date and revocation functionalities that satisfy these properties. We assume
a very general scenario in which a population of user devices (which could be
anything from employee smartcards to enterprise HSMs and can include clients
and servers) wish to establish keys and communicate securely between them-
selves, and a small number of administrator devices are used only to setup new
devices and to revoke compromised keys. We start from an existing API for
symmetric key management [4] capable of supporting a variety of protocols and
show how to extend it with commands for revocation and update of long-term
keys. Our design allows the right to update long-term keys to be shared or
delegated in a secure way, making it suitable for the modern embedded systems
environment where many actors (manufacturer, infrastructure provider, service
provider, application developer) may need different access rights. We also dis-
cuss some limitations of revocation when symmetric key cryptography is the
only operation available (as is in fact the case in many real-world embedded
systems).
Our second main contribution is a formal proof of security of our API. We
show that it ensures two main properties. First, when a key is lost, the system
is able to repair itself after some time. Indeed, our first technique for revoking
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a key is time-based: each key expires after some delay. Second, if the need to
revoke a key is urgent, an explicit revocation command allows us to immediately
secure the device, by prohibiting keys of certain levels for a certain period of
time. We show in an example how with careful labelling of key levels this can be
used to maintain full functionality. Our API makes use of special management
keys, which may of course be revoked as well. Our security proofs are carried out
in a symbolic model, based on terms for representing messages. The detailed
proofs are included in an appendix. A short version of this report has been
accepted to CCS’12 [5].
Related work Most deployed key revocation mechanisms are quite simple.
For example, the Trusted Platform Module [15] supports a TPM_OwnerClear
command that resets the ‘ownership’ status of the device and erases most keys
such as the root key for the storage hierarchy. It does not support, for exam-
ple, the revocation of individual keys in the hierarchy. In multicast group key
management schemes, hierarchies are also standard, and here revocation of a
key corresponds either to permanent removal of an entity from the group, or re-
moval until the entity resubscribes, in which case long term secrets are assumed
to be still intact. Our work will not make this assumption. One lesson from
this domain is that many proposals published without proofs of security have
turned out to have attacks [14].
Richer key revocation schemes have received some previous attention in the
academic literature, e.g. in the key management schemes of wireless sensor net-
works. Here nodes in the network are expected to be deployed in hostile envi-
ronments where key compromise may occur. Eschenauer and Gligor propose a
scheme under which every node i shares a long-term symmetric key KCi with a
control server [7]. If a node n is compromised, the server sends a fresh signature
key Si to each nodes i sharing keys with n encrypted under KCi, and then signs
a list of keys to be revoked and sends this list to each i. The nodes then delete
the keys, isolating the compromised node. This scheme has two disadvantages
for the general case: first it assumes that a central authority knows the key
identifiers of all the keys in the network and between what parties they are
shared, and second it has no way to recover a device which has lost its KCi
to the attacker. An alternative scheme is KeyRev [17], which proposes the use
of a secret sharing scheme to distribute session keys only to unrevoked nodes,
thereby isolating compromised notes without explicitly revoking their long term
keys. Again this has the disadvantage that the loss of a long term key means the
unrecoverable loss of a device: acceptable in a wireless sensor network perhaps
but not in the general case. In this paper we aim to be able to securely update
all keys on the device, provided not too many keys have been compromised.
The Sevecom API [9] is a proposal for an on-board tamper-resistant device
to handle cryptography in next-generation vehicles supporting VANETs (vehicle
to vehicle ad-hoc networks). It includes two root public keys which are used
to check authenticity of messages coming from a central server. The signed
messages from the central server are used to trigger updates of working keys.
The Sevecom API is interesting because it allows update of the long term root
keys using a simple two step protocol. We will examine this example in more
detail in the next section.
There are other proposals for key management APIs with security proofs in
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the literature, but none of these address the question of revocation [3, 6, 8].
2 Revocation API Design Issues
We set the following requirements for our design: (1) the device should return
to full functionality whenever possible, and (2) all secret values should be revo-
cable. Resources within the tamper-resistant boundary of an embedded crypto
device are usually tightly restricted. We therefore design our API to use a min-
imum of memory (instead of storing lists of blacklisted keys, we blacklist sets of
keys through their attributes) and cryptographic functionality (just symmetric
encryption using an authenticated encryption scheme). We do however require
that the devices contain loosely synchronized real-time clocks. This assumption
is standard in some domains, e.g. on-vehicle cryptographic units [9], Smart-
meters, but is not suitable for every application - we will comment briefly in
section 6 on how to adapt our design to devices without clocks.
Our starting point is a generalisation of the symmetric key management
API of Cortier and Steel [4], which defines a simple hierarchy on keys under
management whereby keys higher in the hierarchy are allowed to encrypt (wrap)
keys lower down, for storage outside the device or as part of a key exchange
protocol. We will describe the API fully in the next section. Here we note some
design constraints that are imposed on us by our key revocation requirements,
since these may be of independent interest to future designers of revocation
APIs.
Firstly, since we can have no single upper bound to the key hierarchy in
order to satisfy requirement (2), our design must incorporate a set of keys of
the same level Max which can revoke each other. The Sevecom API mentioned
in section 1 tackles this by having two root keys, where knowledge of the private
halves of both is required in order to revoke and update any one of them. The
update protocol is given in figure 1, where the terms to the left of the semi-colon
represent protocol messages, and the terms to the right are predicates on the
state of the device. Initially, the device is in a ‘two key state’, with root keys
k1 and k2 available for use. Then a revoke message is given for key k1, which
consists of k1 signed under its own private half inv(k1 ). The device receives
this and deletes k1 , moving into a ‘one key state’ where no further revocation
messages will be processed. Then an update message is given, using k2 to sign
the new root key k3 .
RevokeRootKey1 :
{k1}inv(k1 ); keys(k1, k2) → ; keys(_, k2)
UpdateRootKey1 :
{k3}inv(k2 ); keys(_, k2) → ; keys(k2, k3)
Figure 1: Sevecom Revocation Protocol (simplified)
At first it may seem that this protocol is achieves its security goal: unless
the intruder manages to obtain access to both inv(k1 ) and inv(k2 ), he can-
not replace a key with one of his own. However, analysis by Mödersheim and
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Modesti showed that there is another attack scenario [12]: suppose an attacker
had corrupted only inv(k2 ), and then waited until the server sent a revocation
message for k1 . He could then intervene and inject his own root key ki using
inv(k2 ) to sign it. In a footnote, Mödersheim and Modesti propose that both
signature keys be used to sign both messages, and the current public keys be
included in the message to prevent replays of old updates. They did not verify
this solution however. In our scheme we generalise the idea to a scheme where
some number NMax of the K level Max keys are required in order to revoke and
replace one. We similarly require the revocation message to demonstrate knowl-
edge of the current key in order to avoid replays, but we do this by encrypting
under the old key rather than adding it to the plaintext, to prevent possible key
cycles. Since the old key may be corrupted, it is the innermost encryption. A
revocation message, e.g. ‘replace ki with kj ’, will therefore have the following
form:
{update, kj}
kik1
. . .
kn
In our setting, we only have symmetric key cryptography available, so un-
like the public keys in Sevecom, our root keys must remain confidential. This
imposes an upper limit to the security we can achieve: if at any point in the
future, it is possible for the attacker to obtain all the keys k1, . . . , kn, then he
will obtain also kj , and by repeating this for all the subsequent key updates
be able to obtain NMax of the current level Max keys. To prevent this, for our
security proofs, we demand that ‘honest’ updates to the level Max keys, i.e.
updates generated by the server, remain unknown to the attacker. In practice
this could mean that the level Max keys are only updated when the device is
connected to a trusted host. If this is too cumbersome for the application then
a quantitative risk assessment would have to be undertaken to set the N and
K high enough to achieve the required degree of security. A full solution would
require asymmetric cryptography, as we will discuss in section 6. Note that we
will still prove that the device will resist attacks against fake update messages
constructed by the intruder, even when he has corrupted individual level Max
keys.
For keys of lower level than Max, we assume that the attacker can see all
(encrypted) update messages. We need some way to ensure freshness of mes-
sages containing keys encrypted by other keys, otherwise revocation will be
ineffective. To see this, consider the following example: Assume {..., k3, ...}k5
and {..., k3, ...}k4 have been sent out through normal key encryption commands,
with ki at level i(< Max) in the hierarchy. Assume that at some point k4 is lost
to the attacker. Then he learns k3 as well (by decrypting the second message).
Our revocation API would allow us to remove k4, and if we are smart we will
also remove k3 since it must be assumed to be lost as well. However, this will
not suffice: the attacker could replay the key distribution message {..., k3, ...}k5 ,
and therefore re-inject the corrupted k3 into the device. To avoid this one could
blacklist all keys below a corrupted key, which is problematic (this blacklist
will take up device memory and will have to be kept indefinitely), or revoke all
the keys in the hierarchy all the way to the top (impractical), or assure some
kind of freshness of key distribution messages. We choose the latter option,
requiring that every key is given a validity time when it is issued. After the
expiry date passes, the device will refuse to use the key. Without this prop-
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erty, we would need some other way to ensure freshness of all messages, such as
challenge-response exchanges for every message.
Finally, note that though we design our API to use memory efficiently, we
do not explicitly analyse its resistance to denial of service attacks.
3 Description of the API
We describe the design and commands for our key management and key revo-
cation API.
3.1 Setting
We assume that keys are structured in a hierarchy, such that a key k1 may
encrypt a key k2 only if k1 is greater than k2. More precisely, we assume a
set of levels L equipped with a (partial) order <, a maximal element Max and
minimal element 0. Management keys used for revocation or updates will be
keys of maximum level Max, and knowledge of at least NMax of them will be
required for many operations. We also assume that a level can only be compared
to finite number of levels. More precisely, we assume that for any l ∈ L, the set
{l′ | l′ < l} is finite. This will ensure that we have no infinite sequence of the
form {. . . k1 . . .}k2 , {. . . k2 . . .}k3 , . . .
We assume that each tamper resistant device (TRD) a has:
• a clock, whose current time is given by ta ∈ T where T is an infinite
ordered set of time events. For example, T may be R+, the set of non
negative real numbers. For simplicity, we will assume that all clocks are
synchronized with a global clock, referred to as the time of the global
system. Our security properties could be adapted to take account of clock
drift, provided some limit on the drift is assured.
• a table Θa of keys. Each entry in the table is indexed by a handle h
and the corresponding entry Θa(h) is (k, l, v,m) where k is the actual key
stored on the TRD, l is its corresponding level, v its validity date of the
key, and m ∈ M is a miscellaneous field that may describe some other
attributes of the key (e.g. describing the purpose of the key).
• a blacklist Ba of elements of the form (l, t) where l is a level and t is an
expiration time. Intuitively, whenever (l, t) occurs in a blacklist, it means
that the TRD will never accept a key of level l (or below), unless time t
has now passed.
Intuitively, the design of our API will ensure that a key may only encrypt
other keys lower in the hierarchy whose validity dates have not expired.
We also assume that the TRDs share a function δ : L → T , that associates
lifetime to keys depending on their levels. We may sometimes abbreviate δ(l) by
δl. Since we have assumed that a level can only be compared to finite number of
levels, we can compute the maximum lifetime of a chain of levels, smaller than
a given level. Formally, we consider the function
∆ : l 7→ max
l1<···<ln<l,n∈N
n∑
i=1
δ(li)
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Intuitively, ∆(l) is the time where compromising a key k of level l may com-
promise keys of lower levels, even if the validity time of k has expired, due to
chains of encryptions (see Section 5).
For initialisation, we assume that each device contains at least NMax keys of
level Max which are known to an administrator. From this, using the commands
of the API, the administrator can bootstrap the system and, if necessary, update
all the level Max keys.
3.2 Commands
We first give the standard commands which do not concern revocation or keys of
level Max, but suffice for normal key management operations. The are mostly
the same as in the original API, [4], where they were shown to be sufficient
to implement a number of key establishment protocols while always keeping
sensitive keys in the secure memory of the TRD, never exposing them in the
clear on the host machine. We have generalised the ordering on the hierarchy
and introduced checking of the validity time of keys and a blacklist Ba of key
levels together with expiration times. We will write l ∈ Ba if there is (l′, t) ∈ Ba
with l ≤ l′ and t a valid time. We also assume a test Distinct(h1, . . . , hn) which
checks that the hi are pairwise distinct.
Public generation
The generation command for public (level 0) data (e.g a fresh public nonce),
which possibly takes an argument m ∈M, is defined as follows. It returns both
the value and a handle to the value as stored on the device.
generatePublic(m)
let h = Fresh(Ha) in
Ha := Ha ∪ {h}
let n = Fresh(N) in
N := N ∪ {n}
let v = t+ δ(0) in
Θa := Θa ∪ {h→ (n, 0, v,m)}
return h, n
where Fresh(E) (respectively with E ∈ {Ha, N,K}) returns a element of the
set E \ E (respectively with E ∈ {Ha,N ,K}).
Secret generation
The generation command for a secret key, with level of security l and, possibly,
an argument m ∈M:
generateSecret(l,m)
if 0 < l < Max
let h = Fresh(Ha) in
Ha := Ha ∪ {h}
let k = Fresh(K) in
K := K ∪ {k}
let v = ta + δ(l) in
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Θa := Θa ∪ {h→ (k, l, v,m)}
return h
Encryption
The encryption command takes as input a list of data that are meant to be
encrypted (which may include handles pointing to values stored on the device)
and a handle for the key k that will be used for encryption. We check that k
has not expired and is not below a level which has been blacklisted. For each
term to be encrypted, we check the level is lower than that of k, the expiration
date is valid, and that the level is not blacklisted. Note that break aborts the
entire command.
encrypt([X1, . . . , Xn], h)
let (k, l, v,m) = Θa(h) in
if (l = Max) ∨ (v ≤ ta) ∨ (l ∈ Ba)
break
for i = 1..n
if Xi = Mi,mi /* message */
Yi := (Mi, 0, ta + δ(0),mi)
if Xi = hi /* handle */
let (ki, li, vi,mi) = Θa(hi) in
if (li < l) ∧ (vi > ta) ∧ (l /∈ Ba)
Yi := (ki, li, vi,mi)
else break
return {Y1, . . . , Yn}k
Decryption
The decryption command takes as inputs a handle for the key that will be used
for decryption and a cipher-text. We also assume that decrypt throws break on
failure of authentication (i.e. we assume an authenticated encryption scheme).
Note that the checks on the levels etc. performed during encryption are repeated.
This is important for security in the presence of corrupted keys.
decrypt(C, h)
let (k, l, v,m) = Θa(h) in
if (l = Max) ∨ (v ≤ ta) ∨ (l ∈ Ba)
break
let X1, . . . , Xn = dec(k,C) in
for i = 1..n
let (ki, li, vi,mi) = Xi in
if (li = 0) ∧ (ta < vi ≤ ta + δ(li)) ∧ (li /∈ Ba)
Yi := ki,mi /* message */
elsif (li < l) ∧ (ta < vi ≤ ta + δ(li)) ∧ (li /∈ Ba)
let hi = Fresh(Ha) in
Ha := Ha ∪ {hi}
Yi := hi /* handle */
Θa := Θa ∪ {hi → (ki, li, vi,mi)}
else break
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return Y1, . . . , Yn
3.3 Management of Revocation keys
We now introduce the commands for managing keys of level Max, which will
only need to be used if a compromise to one of these keys is suspected. These
keys, called revocation keys, can be used either to revoke and update lower
level keys (keys with a smaller level than Max), or to revoke and update the
revocation keys. At least NMax revocation keys must be given to revoke or
update a revocation key.
Update Max
If we cannot trust a certain revocation key anymore, the administrator can
update it using the updateMax function. It takes as inputs a cipher-text of the
key to be updated and its update encrypted with n revocation keys k1, . . . , kn
such that n ≥ NMax and takes also the corresponding handles where these keys
are stored, h1, . . . , hn. updateMax commands will be assumed to be sent on
secure channels to avoid that, if an attacker breaks very old Max keys, he could
immediately deduce the current active Max keys. Actually, we do not need all
updateMax commands to be runned under secure channels but simply that this
occurs sufficiently regularly.
updateMax(C, h1, . . . , hn)
for i = 1..n
let (ki,Max, vi,mi) = Θa(hi) in
if ∃ j ∈ J1, nK s.t. vj ≤ ta ∨ ¬Distinct(h1, . . . , hn)
break
let (updateMax, k′, v′k,m
′
k) = dec(k1, . . . , dec(kn, C)) in
if (v′k ≤ ta) ∨ (v′k > ta + δMax)
break
Θa(h1) := (k
′,Max, v′k,m
′
k)
Note that the updateMax command does not introduce key cycles and avoid
replays.
3.4 Management of Working keys
We call any key of level l : l < Max a working key. We include separate
commands for creating working keys on the device and for updating or revoking
them, each of which require a NMax level Max keys. These commands are in
addition to the usual operational key management functions arising from the
encryption and decryption commands given in section 3.2: they are intended
to be used for bootstrapping the system or for removing and updating possibly
compromised keys. In the descriptions below, n ≥ NMax.
Create
The create function takes as inputs a cipher-text containing the “order” to create
and the different data to create, the whole encrypted with n revocation keys
Inria
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k1, . . . , kn and takes also the corresponding handles where these keys are stored,
h1, . . . , hn.
create(C, h1, . . . , hn)
for i = 1..n
let (ki,Max, v
′
i,m
′
i) = Θa(hi) in
if ∃ j ∈ J1, nK s.t. v′j ≤ ta ∨ ¬Distinct(h1, . . . , hn)
break
let C ′ = dec(k1, . . . , dec(kn, C)) in
let (create, x1, l1, v1,m1, . . . , xp, lp, vp,mp) = C
′ in
if ∃ j s.t. (lj ≥ Max) ∨ (vj ≤ ta)∨
(vj > ta + δ(lj)) ∨ (lj ∈ Ba)
break
for j = 1..p
let h′i = Fresh(Ha) in
Ha := Ha ∪ {h′i}
Θ(h′i) := (xi, li, vi,mi)
return h′1, . . . , h
′
p
Update
The update function takes as inputs a cipher-text containing the “order” to
update, the different values to change and their updates, the whole encrypted
with n revocation keys k1, . . . , kn and takes also the corresponding handles where
these keys are stored, h1, . . . , hn.
update(C, h1, . . . , hn)
for i = 1..n
let (ki,Max, vi,mi) = Θa(hi) in
if ∃ j ∈ J1, nK s.t. vj ≤ ta ∨ ¬Distinct(h1, . . . , hn)
break
let C ′ = dec(k1, . . . , dec(kn, C)) in
let (update, x1, x
′
1, l
′
1, v
′
1,m
′
1, . . . , xp, x
′
p, . . . ,m
′
p) = C
′ in
for j = 1..p
for h ∈ Ha s.t. Θ(h) = (xj , l, v,m)
if (l < Max) ∧ (l′j = l) ∧ (ta < v′j ≤ ta + δ(lj))
∧(l′j /∈ Ba)
Θ(h) := (x′j , l
′
j , v
′
j ,m
′
j)
Revoke
We first define the revoke command in its most general form. The administrator
may wish to revoke keys, for example if he suspects them to be compromised.
He may wish to revoke a precise set of keys but he may also wish to revoke them
on the basis of their attributes, e.g. validity time. To be as flexible as possible,
we consider a revoke command that is parametrized by a function F such that :
F : L × T ×M→ {⊥,>}
which defines, according to some criteria (e.g. level, validity, etc) what is going
to be kept or deleted.
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The revoke function takes as input such a function F , encrypted with n
revocation keys, and the corresponding handles h1, . . . , hn.
revoke(C, h1, . . . , hn)
for i = 1..n
let (ki,Max, vi,mi) = Θa(hi) in
if ∃ j ∈ J1, nK s.t. vj ≤ ta ∨ ¬Distinct(h1, . . . , hn)
break
let (revoke, F ) = dec(k1, . . . , dec(kn, C)) in
for h ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (x, i, v,m)
if F (i, v,m) = >
Θa := Θa \ {h 7→ (x, i, v,m)}
Note that, in practice an implementation should offer some specialized revoke
functions for the particular application. Indeed, sending an arbitrary Boolean
function as a parameter would raise both implementation and security issues.
However, by defining F in this general way we ensure that our security results
hold for any choice of F .
Blacklist
The Blacklist function takes as input a cipher-text containing the levels to black-
list together with expiration times, encrypted with n revocation keys k1, . . . , kn.
The effect of the command is to add the levels to the blacklist and erase all the
keys of the corresponding levels, including smaller ones. Blacklisting the level
instead of all the keys saves memory. It also means the administrator does not
need to retain the actual values of all the working keys.
blacklist(C, h1, . . . , hn)
for i = 1..n
let (ki,Max, vi,mi) = Θa(hi) in
if ∃ j ∈ J1, nK s.t. vj ≤ ta ∨ ¬Distinct(h1, . . . , hn)
break
let (blacklist, (l1, t1), . . . , (lp, tp)) =
dec(k1, . . . , dec(kn, C)) in
for i = 1..p
/* add to blacklist */
Ba := Ba ∪ {(li, ti)}
/* erase affected keys */
for h ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (x′, l′, v′,m′)
if l′ ≤ li
Θa := Θa \ {h 7→ (x′, l′, v′,m′)}
3.5 Example
Let us consider two TRDs a and b (see Figure 2) initialized with handles con-
taining keys of level Max k and k′ and sharing key k1 of level l1. In a first step,
the user of device a generates, using the generateSecret command, a secret key
k2 with a level l2 (such that l2 < l1) and a validity v2, this new secret appears
in TRD a stored under a new handle. To share the key with b, a encrypts k2
under k1 using encrypt. When the message is received by the user of b he uses
the decrypt command which will store the new key k2 under a new handle.
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TRD a
k,Max, v,m
k1, l1, v1,m1
· · ·
TRD b
k′,Max, v′,m′
k1, l1, v1,m1
· · ·
generateSecret−−−−−−−−→
TRD a
k,Max, v,m
k1, l1, v1,m1
· · ·
k2, l2, v2,m2
TRD b
k′,Max, v′,m′
k1, l1, v1,m1
· · ·
{k2,l2,v2,m2}k1−−−−−−−−−−→
TRD a
k,Max, v,m
k1, l1, v1,m1
· · ·
k2, l2, v2,m2
TRD b
k′,Max, v′,m′
k1, l1, v1,m1
· · ·
k2, l2, v2
Figure 2: A simple execution. A key is created on device a and shared with
device b.
3.6 Threat Scenario
We consider a scenario where the attacker:
• controls the network (he may read and send messages on the network),
• controls the host machines on which the TRD are connected; therefore he
can execute API commands on any TRD
• may break some arbitrary keys of his choice, typically by brute-forcing
some keys or employing side-channel attacks.
In the remainder of the paper we show that, provided the attacker does not
break too many keys of level Max (an attacker should not break more than
NMax−1 keys simultaneously stored on a TRD), then our system can self-repair
given time or one can explicitly fix a TRD. More precisely, we show the two
following results:
• If some key of level l 6= Max is lost then after some time (actually, at time
v + δl where v is the validity date of the lost key) the keys of level l are
secure again.
• Moreover, if some key of level l 6= Max is lost and a TRD receives a
command blacklisting the level l, then all the keys on the TRD are secure
again.
Note that our analysis will not deal with denial of service attacks.
4 Formal Model
We study the security offered by our model in a symbolic model, where messages
are represented by terms, following a now standard approach used for many
protocols (see e.g. [1, 2, 11]).
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4.1 Syntax
We assume a finite set of names A and two infinite sets N and K respectively
for nonces and keys. We also assume a finite set H representing handles and an
infinite set M representing the miscellaneous fields, with  ∈ M representing
the empty element. We recall that L denotes the set of levels. Messages are
represented using a term algebra Terms defined by the following grammar:
T, T1, T2, . . . := a | n | k | l | t | m | {T}k | 〈T1, T2〉
where a ∈ A, n ∈ N , k ∈ K, l ∈ L, t ∈ T , m ∈ M. The term {t}k rep-
resents the message t (symmetrically) encrypted by the key k while the term
〈t1, t2〉 represents the concatenation (or more precisely, the pairing) of the two
messages t1 and t2. For simplicity, we will often write t1, t2, . . . , tn instead of
〈t1, 〈t2, . . . 〈tn−1, tn〉 . . .〉. The notion of subterm is defined as usual: t′ is a sub-
term of t if t′ occurs at some position p in t, that is t|p = t′. We denote by
St(m) the set of subterms of m and by extension St(S) is the set of subterms of
terms in S.
A global state of our system is described by a tuple
(P, I,M, N,K, t) where P ⊆ A is the set of TRDs in the system, t ∈ T rep-
resents the current time, M ⊆ Terms represents the set of messages sent so far
over the network, N and K are respectively sets of currently used nonces and
keys1 by all the APIs and I is a function:
I : a 7→ (Θa, Ha,Ba, ta, Na,Ka)
that represents the current local state of the TRD a ∈ P. More precisely,
Ha ⊆ H represents the finite set of handles currently used in the API a and
Ba ⊆ L×T represents the set of blacklisted levels for which the TRD does not
accept keys anymore. Na ⊆ N and Ka ⊆ K are respectively the nonces and
keys that have been generated or stored on the API. Θa represents the key table
of the TRD. Formally, it is a function
Θa : Ha → (K ∪N )× L× T ×M
Indeed, as seen in Section 3.1, each handle h ∈ Ha points to an entry (x, l, v,m)
corresponding a nonce or a key x and its attributes: the level l, its validity v,
and other miscellaneous information m.
As indicated in the definition of a global state, all keys come with a level.
Definition 1. Let (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state and let k be a key in K.
The level of k is defined as follows :
Level(k) = {l | ∃ a ∈ P, h ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (k, l, v,m)}
It is a priori possible for a key k to have several levels (i.e. Level(k) is
not a singleton) but we will show in our proofs that this never happens for
uncompromised keys. We will therefore say that a key k is of level l if l ∈
Level(k).
1N and K are here as artifacts of the model. Since an API gets a random key (or nonce)
when it creates it, there is very little chance that it generates a key (or nonce) which has
already been used. To capture this, we model a global knowledge of all nonces and keys used
by all APIs to be sure that freshly generated keys (or nonces) are new.
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t ∈M
M ` t
M ` x,M ` y
M ` 〈x, y〉
M ` 〈x, y〉
M ` x
M ` 〈x, y〉
M ` y
M ` x,M ` y
M ` {x}y
M ` {x}t,M ` y
M ` x
Figure 3: Deduction Rules (Intruder)
4.2 Semantics
The behavior of our API is modeled by the transitions of our formal system.
We define four kinds of transitions: transition of time, forgery by the attacker,
silent transitions, and key management commands.
Transition of time We assume that the execution of API commands is in-
stantaneous (this could be adapted to take into account worst case execution
time). The effect of the time is modelled by a separate and explicit TIM tran-
sition:
(TIM) (P, I,M, N,K, t) (Time passes)−−−−−−−−→ (P, I,M, N,K, t′)
with t′ > t.
Forgery by the attacker As is usually the case in formal models, the ability
of the attacker to construct, or deduce, is modeled by a relation `. We write
S ` m ifm can be deduced from S. The deduction relation is formally defined in
Figure 3 Intuitively, the attacker can deduce any term that can be obtained by
pairing, encrypting, projecting, and decrypting whenever it has the encryption
key.
Example 1. Let S = {{k1}k2 , 〈k2, k3〉, {k4}k5}. Then S ` k1, S ` k2, S ` k3,
but S 6` k4, S 6` k5. We also have S ` 〈k2, k1〉, but S 6` 〈k2, k4〉.
The attacker may send any deducible message over the network. This is
reflected by the following transition.
(DED) (P, I,M, N,K, t) (Deduction)−−−−−−−→ (P, I,M ∪ {m}, N,K, t)
provided M ` m}.
Silent transitions Each API command executed on a TRD a with input m
defines a transition Θa, Ha,Ba → Θ′a, H ′a,B′a. Moreover, the TRD outputs
some message m′. Given a global state (P, I,M, N,K, t) such that m ∈M, the
corresponding global transition is
(P, I,M, N,K, t)→ (P, I ′,M ∪ {m′}, N ∪N ′,K ∪K ′, t)
with N ′ and K ′ being respectively the sets of nonces and keys generated by a
during the execution of the command. The function I ′ is defined by I ′ : a 7→
(Θ′a, H
′
a,B
′
a, ta) for the corresponding API a and I ′(a′) = I(a′) otherwise.
RR n° 7949
16 Cortier, Steel & Wiedling
(UPM) (P, I,M, N,K, t) updateMax−−−−−−→ (P, I ′,M, N ′,K ′, t)
(NEW) (P, I,M, N,K, t)
create−−−→ (P, I ′,M ∪ {m}, N ′,K ′, t)
with m = {create, N,N ′, x1, l1, v1,m1 . . . ,mp}k1···kn
(UPD) (P, I,M, N,K, t)
update−−−−→ (P, I ′,M ∪ {m}, N ′,K ′, t)
with m′ = {update, x1, x′1, l′1, v′1,m′1 . . . ,m′p}k1···kn
(RVK) (P, I,M, N,K, t)
revoke−−−→ (P, I ′,M ∪ {m}, N,K, t)
with m = {revoke, F}k1···kn
(BLK) (P, I,M, N,K, t)
blacklist−−−−→ (P, I ′,M ∪ {m}, N,K, t)
with m = {blacklist, (l1, t1), . . . , (ln, tn)}k1···kn
For each transition, the function I ′ and the sets N ′ and K ′ are updated as
specified by the corresponding command, as for silent transitions.
Figure 4: Key management command transitions
Key management commands As explained in Section 2, at least some
revocation commands need to be kept hidden from the attacker. Otherwise,
assuming that the attacker controls and memorizes all the traffic on the network
and assuming he can break keys (which corresponds to our threat scenario),
then breaking NMax old keys may compromise the entire system, even if the
compromised keys had not been in use for some time.
We therefore assume that the key management commands for keys of level
Max are sent over a private channel. In practice, this could be achieved by
several means. For example, we may assume that the key administrator has a
physical access to the TRD that needs to be updated. Or we may also assume
that the user would connect his/her TRD to a trusted machine, on which a
secure channel (e.g. via TLS) is established with the key administrator. Note
that the key management commands for keys of level Max are executed only
when a key of level Max is lost (or suspected to be lost), or when keys of level
Max are updated (e.g. when their validity has expired). We expect these events
to occur infrequently.
Note that our assumption does not prevent an adversary from trying to run
the UPM command. In particular, in case it has sufficiently many keys of level
Max, it may well build a well formed Update Max command and send it to a
TRD. This is reflected in the silent transitions defined above.
All the other key management commands can be sent over an insecure net-
work. The corresponding transition system is presented in Figure 4. The fact
that we assume the UPM command is sent over a secure channel is reflected in
the fact that the set M remains unchanged for this transition.
In the remainder of the paper we assume that managers in charge of generat-
ing key management commands behave consistently. More precisely, we assume
that they only use fresh keys when updating and creating keys and that they
never give different attributes to the same key value.
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Key compromise We model the fact that the attacker may compromise a
key by adding a transition lost, which allows an attacker to obtain a key of his
choice.
(LST) (P, I,M, N,K, t) Lost(k)−−−−→ (P, I,M ∪ {k}, N,K, t)
where k is a key that appears on at least one TRD, that is k occurs in the image
of I.
4.3 Example
Let us reconsider the example of Figure 2. Let E be the initial global state, we
have E = (P, I,M, N,K, t). To simplify, let us consider that P = {a, b}, K =
{k, k′, k1}, t and M are arbitrary. Then I = {a 7→ (Θa, Ha,Ba, ta, Na,Ka),
b 7→ (Θb, Hb,Bb, tb, Nb,Kb)} where ta = tb = t, Ha = {h1, h2}, Hb = {h′1, h′2},
Ka = Kb = K. We have Θa(h1) = (k,Max, v,m), Θb(h′1) = (k′,Max, v′,m′)
and Θa(h2) = Θb(h′2) = (k1, l1, v1,m1).
Using the generationSecret command with TRD a will lead to a global
state E′ = (P, I ′,M, N,K ′, t) where I ′ = {a 7→ (Θ′a, H ′a,Ba, ta, Na,K ′a), b 7→
(Θb, Hb,Bb, tb, Nb,Kb)} with K ′a = K ′ = K ∪ {k2}, H ′a = Ha ∪ {h2} and
Θ′a = Θa ∪ {h3 7→ (k2, l2, v2,m2)}.
Then the encrypt command leads to a global state E′′ = (P, I,M′, N,K, t)
where M′ = M ∪ {{k2, l2, v2}k1}. Finally the decrypt command is used by
TRD b on the message {k2, l2, v2}k1 . That leads to E′′′ = (P, I ′′′,M, N,K, t)
with I ′′′ = {a 7→ (Θ′a, H ′a,Ba, ta, Na,K ′a), b 7→ (Θ′′′b , H ′′′b ,Bb, tb, Nb,K ′′′b )} with
K ′′′b = Kb ∪ {k2}, H ′′′b = Hb ∪ {h′3} and Θ′′′b = Θb ∪ {h′3 7→ (k2, l2, v2,m2)}.
5 Security
We are now ready to formally state the security properties discussed in sec-
tion 3.6. Intuitively, we would like to show that apart from explicitly lost keys,
any key that has not expired is secure, that is, cannot be deduced by the at-
tacker. However, this is not strictly the case: several commands such as encrypt
or the administrator commands produce messages of the form {. . . k′ . . .}k that
are sent over the network and possibly stored by the attacker. It could the case
that k expires before k′. Clearly, if k becomes known to the attacker then k′
will be immediately known as well, even if k has expired and k′ has not.
Therefore, we distinguish three kinds of key: valid keys, latent keys, and
dead keys. Informally, valid keys are those stored on a device whose validity
time has not passed, latent keys are those which are not valid but on which
security of some encryption of a valid lower level key might still depend, and
dead keys are everything else.
Definition 2. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state and k ∈ K. Given
a ∈ P, we denote by Θa the key table stored on a and defined by I(a) = (Θa, . . .).
• k is a valid key if ∃ a ∈ P, ∃ h ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (k, l, v,m) with v > ta
or if there exists
{. . . , k, l, v,m, . . .} ∈ St(M) with v > t.
We denote by VE the set of valid keys in E.
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• k is a latent key if ∃ a ∈ P, ∃ h ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (k, l, v,m) with v +
∆(l) > t or if there exists
{. . . , k, l, v,m, . . .} ∈ St(M) with v + ∆(l) > t.
We denote by UE the set of latent keys in E. The notation UE comes
from the fact that these keys may also be viewed as “undead”.
• Otherwise, k is a dead key.
A key is latent if it expired but less than ∆(l) ago. The reason why latent
keys still influence the security of the whole system can be illustrated with the
following scenario. Let k be a key of level l and validity time v and consider
l1 < · · · < ln < l such that ∆(l) =
∑n
i=1 δ(li). Then it may be the case
that k was used to encrypt a key kn of level ln just before its expiration time,
yielding the message {kn, ln, vn,mn}k with vn = v + δ(ln). Similarly, each key
ki may have been used to encrypt a key ki−1 of level li−1, yielding a message
{ki−1, li−1, vi−1,mi−1}ki with vi−1 = vi + δ(li−1). Then it is easy to see that
v1 = v + ∆(l) and clearly if k is lost at anytime after its expiration date v but
before v+∆(l) then the security of k1 (valid) would be immediately compromised
as well.
5.1 Initial states
As discussed in section 3.2, before being deployed, a TRD is loaded with some
level Max keys so that the administrator can then remotely equip the device
with an initial set of working keys.
Definition 3. A global state E∅ is said to be originating if E∅ = (P, I0, ∅, 0, ∅, ∅)
with I0 : a 7→ (Θa, Ha, 0, ∅, ∅) and for all a ∈ P, we have Ha = {ha1 , . . . , han} with
Θa(h
a
i ) = (k
a
i ,Max, v
a
i ,m
a
i ). The kai keys are revocation keys initially placed in
the memory of each API and should be all distinct: kai = kaj implies i = j.
5.2 Keys of level Max
The keys of level Max are crucial since they can be used to update and revoke
all the keys, including keys of level Max themselves. We first show that security
of these keys is preserved, assuming that not too many of the keys of level Max
stored on an API are simultaneously lost.
Hypothesis 1. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state such that E∅ →∗ E
and let L the set of keys that have been lost so far (i.e. the set of keys k such
that the transition Lost(k) has been executed). We assume that ∀a ∈ P, we have
#{k | k ∈ UE ∩L ∩Ka and Max ∈ Level(k)} ≤ NMax − 1
where Ka is the set of keys associated to a by the function I (that is I(a) =
(. . . ,Ka)).
We assume this hypothesis to hold in all the global states we consider in
the remainder of the paper. From a practical point of view, it means that the
lifetime of a key of level Max should be set such that during the time when a
Max key is latent, it is sufficiently unlikely that an attacker will break more than
NMax − 1 such latent keys. More precisely, our assumption is slightly weaker
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since the attacker may break more keys provided that no more than NMax − 1
of them have occurred on the same TRD.
The design of our API ensures that no Max keys can be learned by an
attacker, except for the explicitly lost ones.
Theorem 1. Let E be a global state such that E∅ −→∗ E, then :
∀k ∈ V MaxE \L , E 6` k.
The proof relies on the fact that keys of levelMax only appear in key position
in the messages sent over the network and the fact that for anyMax key, Level(k)
is a singleton. These two properties are shown to be preserved by application of
the rules and rely on Hypothesis 1 that ensures that the attacker never knows
sufficiently many Max keys to forge an administrator command.
5.3 Lower level keys
The case of keys of lower level is more difficult than the case of Max keys.
First, as soon as a key k of level l is lost, then any key of lower level l′ < l
is compromised as well. Indeed, for any key k′ of level l′ < l stored on the
same TRD as the key k, the attacker may use the encrypt command to get k′
encrypted by k and therefore deduce k′. This attack does not only compromise
the keys stored on TRDs that contain the compromised key k. Indeed, assume
that the key k is stored on some TRD a1 and does not appear in some other
TRD a2. Then as soon as a1 and a2 share some key k′′ of level l′′ > l, the
attacker may use the encrypt command on a1 to get k encrypted by k′′. Sending
this encryption to a2 and executing the decrypt command on a2, the attacker
registers k on a2 and can now gain any key of level lower then l.
Therefore, as soon as a key of level l is lost, any key of level l′ < l should be
considered as lost too. We introduce the notion of keys compatible with a set of
levels, which are latent keys that have an uncompromised level.
Definition 4. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state, L a set of keys (typ-
ically lost keys), and k ∈ K. Let Lv be a set of levels (that typically corresponds
to the levels of keys lost so far). Then k is compatible with Lv if k ∈ UE \L ,
Max /∈ Level(k), and there exists l ∈ Level(k) such that l 6< Lv (that is l 6< l′ for
any l′ ∈ Lv).
We note GLv(E,L ) the set of keys compatible with Lv in the global state E. We
may write GLvE instead of GLv(E,L ) when L is clear from the context.
The first property of our API is that keys of levels not marked as lost are un-
compromised. We also show that for such keys, the level and all other attributes
are unique (i.e. consistent across all TRDs). We actually need to enforce a
stronger property, called robustness.
Definition 5. A global state E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) is robust up to a set of
levels Lv and a set L of (lost) keys if the following properties are satisfied:
(1) We consider that (l, v,m) are attributes of k if any of these three cases
holds :
(a) ∃ a ∈ P, h ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (k, l, v,m),
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(b) ∃ q ∈ K, m′ ∈ M s.t. Max ∈ Level(q) and {cmd, . . . , k, l, v,m, . . .
}q1···qjq ∈ St(m′) with cmd 6= blacklist and Max ∈ Level(qi),
(c) ∃ q ∈ K, m′ ∈M s.t. {. . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q ∈ St(m′).
If (l1, v1,m1) and (l2, v2,m2) are attributes of a key k ∈ GLvE , then (l1, v1,m1) =
(l2, v2,m2).
(2) ∀k ∈ GLvE , ∀m ∈M s.t. k ∈ St(m), then, any occurrences of k is of one of
these three forms :
(i) {m′}k,
(ii) {. . . , k, . . . }k′ with k′ ∈ K, vk ≤ vk′ + δk and Level(k) < Level(k′) 6=
Max,
(iii) {. . . , k, . . . }q1···qnk′ with q1, . . . , qn, k′ ∈ K s.t., for i ∈ [1, n], Max ∈
Level(qi), Max ∈ Level(k′), k′ /∈ L and vk ≤ vk′ + δk,
(3) Lv ≥s {l | ∃k ∈ L ∩ UE s.t. l ∈ Level(k)}) where S1 ≥s S2 if for any
l1 ∈ S1, there exists l2 ∈ S2 such that l1 ≥ l2.
Robustness is meant to precisely control how compatible keys occur in a
global state E. It ensures two main properties. First, compatible keys have a
unique attribute in the system, that is, levels and validity times of compatible
keys are consistently propagated through the system. Moreover, robustness
ensures that compatible keys occur only in key position, except if they are
encrypted by a key of greater level or if they occur in an administrator command
(thus encrypted by a key of level Max). The third item is a technical condition
that ensures that levels corresponding to lost (and not yet dead) keys should
always be considered as compromised.
Whenever a state is robust, all its compatible keys remain secret from the
attacker.
Proposition 1. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state, L a set of keys
(typically lost keys), and k ∈ K. Let Lv be a set of levels. Assume that E is
robust up to Lv and L then:
∀k ∈ GLv(E,L ) M 6` k.
Our three main results are:
• A global state is always robust up to the levels of lost keys (Theorem 2).
This means that losing a key does not compromise any other key apart
from those at lower levels than the lost key, i.e. those which are trivially
compromised.
• Once a lost key is dead, the corresponding level is protected again (The-
orem 3), meaning that even when a key is lost and no special action is
taken, the system repairs itself after a certain time.
• When a TRD receives a blacklist command, the corresponding levels are
immediately protected again on this TRD (Theorem 4).
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Theorem 2. Let E be a global state such that E∅ −→∗ E and let L be the set
of keys lost along the execution E∅ −→∗ E. Then E is robust up to Lv = {l |
∃ Lost(k) ∈ L and Level(k) = l} and L .
Theorem 2 is the key theorem of our paper and its proof consists in proving
that robustness is invariant under the rules of our API. Theorem 1 ensures
that it is impossible for an attacker to break more than NMax − 1 keys of level
Max. This, in turn, ensures that all accepted key management commands come
from the administrator. Then it remains to show that the robustness property is
invariant under application of the other rules of the API. For the deduction rule,
the first step is to show that compatible (latent) keys are all non-deducible. For
decryption, the robustness property in the global state E ensures that encrypted
messages have the right form. Therefore when decrypting a message, the newly
stored keys also satisfy the invariant. In case the attacker forges a message, the
checks on the levels and the validity times ensure that the newly stored keys
are of an incompatible level and therefore their security does not need to be
assessed. The arguments for encryption and the other commands are along the
same lines.
Theorem 3. Let E,E′ be two global states such that
E∅ −→∗ E −→∗ E′. Assume that E is robust up to Lv and L and let l ∈ Lv
be a compromised level. Let L ′ be the set of keys lost along the execution
E −→∗ E′. We further assume that there has been no ‘lost’ event for keys of
level greater than l, that is, there is no k ∈ L ′ such that Level(k) ≥ l. Let
v = sup({vk | k ∈ L and Level(k) = l}), where vk is the validity time associated
to k (Theorem 2 ensures vk is unique). Then:
t′ ≥ v + ∆(l) =⇒ E′′ is robust up to L′′v for L ′′,
where t′ is the global time of E′ and E′′ is such that E′
Lost(A)−−−−→ E′′ with A =
{k | Level(k) = l′ with l′ < l} and L′′v = (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k)) \ {l} where
L ′′ = L ′ ∪A.
Intuitively, Theorem 3 ensures that whenever a key k has been lost then once
k is not latent any more (i.e. once k is dead), the system is now robust up to
Lv \{l} plus the levels {l′ | l′ < l} which can still be compromised and the newly
lost keys L ′, that is, the keys that might have been lost during the execution
between E and E′. Theorem 3 is actually a consequence of Theorem 2, which
can be seen by carefully analysing the robustness property and noticing that
once the lost key k is dead, the set of keys compatible with L
′′
v and Lv coincide
(if the keys of lower levels are explicitly lost).
We now state the security gained with the blacklist command. This command
only fixes the system locally. We therefore need to define robustness locally to
a TRD.
Definition 6. Let E be a global state, L be a set of lost keys, and Lv be a set
of levels. Let a ∈ P be a TRD. Then a is locally robust up to Lv and L in E
if Ea = ({a}, Ia,M, N,K, t) is robust up to Lv where Ia is the restriction of I
on {a} and where the conditions of robustness are considered for keys that are
stored on a (that is, appear in the image of Θa).
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Proposition 2 is the analog of Proposition 1 for locally robustness and states
that compatible keys on locally robust TRDs are secure.
Proposition 2. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state, L a set of keys
(typically lost keys), and k ∈ K. Let Lv be a set of levels. Assume that a is
locally robust up to Lv and L in E then:
∀k ∈ GLv(E,L ) ∩ {k′ | ∃h s.t. Θa(h) = (k′, l, v,m)} M 6` k.
Finally, we can state our final theorem that ensures that blacklisting a level
protects the corresponding keys on a TRD.
Theorem 4. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) a be a global state s.t. E∅ −→∗ E. Let
L be a set of (lost) keys. Assume that a ∈ P is locally robust up to Lv and L
in E. Assume that E L−−→−→∗ E′ with L a blacklist command for TRD a, level
l, and validity time th (with th greater or equal to vh = sup({vk | k ∈ L and l ∈
Level(k)}). Let L ′ be the set of keys lost along the execution E L−−→−→∗ E′.
We further assume that there has been no lost event for keys of level greater
than l, that is, there is no k ∈ L ′ such that Level(k) ≥ l.
Then a is locally robust up to L
′′
v = (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k)) \ {l} in E′′ where
E′′ is such that E′
Lost(A)−−−−→ E′′ with A = {k | Level(k) = l′ with l′ < l} and
L ′′ = L ′ ∪A.
Similarly to Theorem 3, Theorem 4 ensures that once a level is blacklisted,
the corresponding level is secure again. More precisely, it states that the system
is then robust up to Lv \ {l} plus the levels {l′ | l′ < l} which can still be
compromised and the newly lost keys L ′, that is, the keys that might have
been lost during the execution between E and E′. The proof follows easily from
Theorem 3.
5.4 Application
Suppose we are using our API to implement a protocol similar to Kerberos [13]
for granting access to resources (see Figure 5). We consider key distribution
centre (KDC ), a ticket granting server (TGS ) and principals Alice (a) and Bob
(b).
We will order the levels using an inclusion ordering, where Ka has level (a),
Ka,TGS has level (a,TGS ,KDC ) and Ka,b has level (a, b,TGS ,KDC ) (i.e. the
levels correspond to the parties assumed to have access to the key). Other terms
are considered public (level 0). For two levels l, l′, l > l′ ⇔ l ⊂ l′. The protocol
is now implementable using the commands of the API.
In a deployment of the system, we assume that devices for the users a,
b,. . . and for the servers TGS ,KDC are loaded with appropriate keys of level
Max as part of some personalisation process. The administrator can then load
long term keys Ka,Ka,TGS etc. on to the user devices and the servers. They
can now play out the protocol using just the working key commands encrypt,
decrypt, secretGenerate, publicGenerate. Note that when implemented by our
API the protocol messages will be tagged following our scheme, e.g. message 2
will appear as {tgt , 0, v′,TGT}KTGS ,
{Ka,TGS , (a,TGS ,KDC ), v,KA,TGS}Ka where TGT and KA,TGS are elements in
the miscellaneous field and v, v′ are some validity times.
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1. a → KDC : request , KDC
2. KDC → a : {tgt}KTGS , {Ka,TGS}Ka
3. a → TGS : a,b, {tgt}KTGS , {Auth1}Ka,TGS
4. TGS → a : {Ka,b}Kb , {Ka,b}Ka,TGS
5. a → b : b, {Ka,b}Kb , {Auth2}Ka,b
Figure 5: A Kerberos-like protocol
Suppose key Ka,TGS is compromised. Then the administrator has two
choices. One is to do nothing. Then he knows that after time v+∆((a,TGS ,KDC )),
where v is the expiry time of Ka,TGS , the system returns to a state where
keys at level (a,TGS ,KDC ) are secure. Lower level keys like session keys
Ka,b might still be compromised, but new session keys will be safe. Alter-
natively he can signal to TGS and a to blacklist the key. In this case this level
(a,TGS ,KDC ) becomes unusable. However, to preserve functionality, and ad-
ministrator can add extra tags ti to all levels, so level (a) becomes (a, t1), level
(a,TGS ,KDC ) becomes (a,TGS ,KDC , t1, t2), and the session keys Ka,b will
have level (a, b,TGS ,KDC , t1, t2, t3). If Ka,TGS is compromised the adminis-
trator only needs to issue a new key with a new level a, b,TGS ,KDC , t1, t′2 and
the device can continue to issue tickets securely while level (a,TGS ,KDC , t1, t2)
is blacklisted.
6 Conclusions
We have presented our API for key management with revocation and proved
its security properties. While the underlying assumptions for our system to be
secure are not unrealistic, in future work we intend to weaken them further.
To relax the assumption on level Max messages remaining confidential seems to
require more cryptographic primitives. In particular, in order to ensure that the
loss of long term keys does not lead to the loss of update messages we require
perfect forward secrecy, which would seem to imply the use of asymmetric cryp-
tography. Extending our API to asymmetric cryptography is ongoing work. We
also assume here that each device has a real time clock. This could be weakened
by adding some sort of nonce based freshness test for each new key accepted, as
required in the restricted version of the API on which our revocation scheme is
based [4]. All our security proofs are made in the symbolic model, but it should
be possible to extend them to the standard model of cryptography under the
usual assumptions, i.e. IND-CCA2 for the authenticated encryption scheme,
since we avoid problematic constructions such as key cycles.
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This appendix contains the proofs of our main theorems.
A Proving Theorem 1
We first prove an easy and rather straightforward lemma that will be often used
in the proofs: if a key appears only in key position in a set of messages, then it
is not deducible.
Lemma 1. We suppose that keys are atomic. Let M be a set of terms and k
a key such that k only appears in key position in m, ∀m ∈ M. Then, ∀t such
that M ` t, k only appears in key position in t, if k appears in it. In particular,
M 6` k.
Proof. Let k be a key and the setM be such as defined. Let us prove the lemma
by induction on the number of steps needed to deduce t.
Base case : All terms in M satisfy the property by hypothesis.
Induction Hypothesis : ∀t such that M ` t in n or less steps, then t
satisfies the property.
Now suppose that M ` t in n+ 1 steps :
• If the last step is a decomposition rule (all rules but encryption and pair-
ing). We that t is a subterm of a term t′ with t′ = {t}v or 〈t, v〉. In the
first one, t′ = {t}v, if k appears not in a key position in t, it appears not
in a key position in t′ too, and we have a contradiction with the induction
hypothesis. The conclusion is the same in the case of the pairing. Thus t,
verifies the property.
• If the last step is the encryption rule, then t is of the form {t′}y with
M ` t′ in n steps. If y = k, then ∃ Π a proof, in n or less steps, of M ` k,
which is a contradiction, since k is not in key position in the term k. Then,
we must have y 6= k and, in that case, the induction hypothesis gives us
the fact that k only appears in key position in t′ and, due to the form of
t, it is clear that t also verifies this property.
• If the last step is the pairing rule, then t is of the form 〈t′, t′′〉 with M `
t′, t′′ in, at most, n steps. Using the induction hypothesis on t′ and t′′ it
is clear that t also satisfy the property.
Moreover, suppose thatM ` k. This contradicts the fact that k only appears
in key position. Thus M 6` k.
Now let us consider the following hypothesis :
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Hypothesis 2. We suppose that the administrator does not make any mis-
takes when performing administration commands, especially, keys are distributed
consistently, with the same attributes and the administrator should not cre-
ate equalities between keys. It means that if ∃ m1,m2 ∈ M such that m1 =
{cmd1, . . . , (k1), k′1, att1, . . . }q1···qn andm2 = {cmd2, . . . , (k2), k′2, att2, . . . }q′1···q′n ,
where atti are the attributes associated to k′i in the command cmdi ∈ {blacklist,
create, update} (and k1, k2 may not appear), then we have that k′1 = k′2 (resp.
k1 = k2) implies cmd1 = cmd2, att1 = att2 and k1 = k2 (resp. k′1 = k′2).
It also means that if there are two updateMax commands m1 and m2 such
that m1 = {updateMax, k, v,m}k1···kn and m2 = {updateMax, k′, v′,m′}k′1···k′n ,
then if k = k′ (or k1 = k′1) then we have m1 = m2.
We also assume that updateMax, update and create commands are made
with fresh keys. Moreover, the administrator performs operations according to
the specification.
Theorem 1 is proved by induction, showing that revocation keys satisfy a
stronger invariant, which is reflected in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let us consider global states E = (P, I, M, N,K, t) and E′ =
(P ′, I ′,M′, N ′,K ′, t′) such that E∅ −→∗ E L−−→ E′. Let L be a set of keys. Let
us consider the following properties :
(1) ∀a ∈ P, ∀h ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (k1,Max, v1,m1) and ∀b ∈ P, ∀h′ ∈ Hb s.t.
Θb(h
′) = (k2,Max, v2,m2), then, we have:
k1 = k2 and k1, k2 /∈ L =⇒ (v1,m1) = (v2,m2).
Moreover, ∀a ∈ P, all revocation keys stored in a given API are different,
i.e. ∀h, h′ ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (k,Max, v,m) and Θa(h′) = (k′,Max, v′,m′),
then k = k′ ⇒ h = h′.
We consider the set U MaxE of latent revocation keys of global state E.
(2) ∀k ∈ U MaxE \L , ∀m ∈M we have, for all occurrences of k in m is of the
form {m′}k.
Then, if E satisfies (1) and (2) for L , then E′ also satisfies them for L ′
with L ′ = L ∪ {k} if E Lost(k)−−−−→ E′ and L ′ = L otherwise.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we will show that properties (1) and (2) are
invariant under application of transition rules :
• E
(DED)−−−−−→ E′. This transition does not affect handles at all, then it is
obvious that (1) is invariant. We also have M′ = M ∪ {u} with M ` u.
Let k ∈ U MaxE \ L such that Level(k) = Max, and m ∈ M′ such that
k ∈ St(m). If m ∈ M, then we conclude using the induction hypothesis
that E verifies (2). We now consider the case where m = u. Using Lemma
1 and induction hypothesis, we know that u is a term where k can only
appear in key position and we conclude that (2) holds.
Considering that and using Lemma 1, we easily obtain following lemma:
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Lemma 2. Let E be a global state satisfying to properties (1) and (2) for L ,
then:
∀k ∈ U MaxE \L , M 6` k.
Now let us continue our proof of Proposition 3.
• E
(TIM)−−−−−→ E′. In this case, we have I ′ = I since there is no modification
of the memory of all TRD’s, thus, (1) holds obviously. Moreover, as we
also have M′ = M, using the fact that there are no keys which are lost
during the transition and since latent revocation keys may only become
dead with time, i.e. U MaxE′ \L ′ ⊆ U MaxE \L , (2) clearly holds for E′.
• E
(LST)−−−−−→ E′. As in the previous case, we have I ′ = I (no modification
of handles on TRD’s), thus, (1) holds. In addition, we have that M′ =
M ∪ {k}, L ′ = L ∪ {k}, with k the lost key, and U MaxE′ = U MaxE since
t′ = t. Let p ∈ U MaxE′ \L ′ and let m ∈ M′ such that p ∈ St(m). Then,
since p 6= k and keys are atomic, we must have p /∈ St(k), thus m ∈ M.
Using the fact that p ∈ U MaxE′ \L ′ ⊆ U MaxE \L and using the fact that
E satisfies (2), we can conclude easily that all occurrence of p in m are of
the form {m′}k and conclude that the property (2) is invariant.
• E
(UPM)−−−−−→ E′.
(1) Let a be the TRD modified by the transition. Consider a1, a2 ∈ P
and h1 ∈ Ha1 , h2 ∈ Ha2 s.t. h1 6= h2, Θa1(h1) = (k1,Max, v1,m1)
and Θa2(h2) = (k2,Max, v2,m2) with k1, k2 /∈ L ′ and k1 = k2. We
note that L ′ = L . We will show that (v1,m1) = (v2,m2) :
– If neither h1 nor h2 has been updated by the transition. Then,
we conclude using the induction hypothesis.
– The case where h1 and h2 where both updated by the transition
is impossible according to the specification of the API.
– Now assume that h1 has been updated (and thus a1 = a) and
h2 has not. We must have that k1 appears in the command of
the transition of the form {updateMax, k1, v1,m1}q1···qn , and we
have two subcases :
∗ Either k1 has never occurred in the system before, then k1 =
k2 is impossible.
∗ Or k1 was already existing in the system, that is, there is
a TRD c and h ∈ Hc s.t. Θc(h) = (k1,Max, v,m). Using
induction hypothesis over h and h2, we have that (v,m) =
(v2,m2). Then, considering that, by case inspection, it is
only possible to put a revocation key in a TRD using an
updateMax command, thus, either k1 was updated in c using
such command or was in c since E∅. Since it is impossible,
according to Hypothesis 1 and Lemma 2, for an intruder to
forge an updateMax command, this must be an action of the
administrator. Then, according to Hypothesis 2, we must
have (v1,m1) = (v,m) otherwise it implies that the admin-
istrator does not act properly. Since (v,m) = (v2,m2), we
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conclude.
Now, let us show that ∀a ∈ P, ∀h, h′ ∈ Ha s.t. Θa(h) = (k,Max, v,m)
and Θa(h′) = (k′,Max, v′,m′), then k = k′ ⇒ h = h′. Let us
consider b ∈ P and h, h′ ∈ Hb s.t. Θb(h) = (k,Max, v,m) and
Θb(h
′) = (k′,Max, v′,m′) with k = k′. If b 6= a, the modified TRD,
then, using induction hypothesis, we have that h = h′. If b = a with
k a revocation key not added in the TRD during the transition, then,
again, the induction hypothesis gives us that h = h′. If k is added in
the TRD during the transition, let us suppose that we have h 6= h′.
Then, we must have that ∃ m1,m2 two updateMax commands com-
ing from the administrator (we showed previously that an intruder
cannot forge such commands) s.t. m1 = {updateMax, k, v,m}q1···qn
and m2 = {updateMax, k, v,m}q′1···q′n with q1 6= q′1 according to the
specification since q1 and q′1 determine the handle where k will be
stored. Such a case is in contradiction with Hypothesis 2. Thus
h′ = h. Finally, we conclude that (1) holds.
(2) In this transition we have M′ = M and even if the set of latent but
not lost revocation key is changed by L, there is no trace of these
new keys in M′, thus we can conclude.
• E L−−→ E′ with L ∈ {(BLK),(NEW),(UPD),(RVK)}. Since these transi-
tions do not affect handles containing revocation keys, it is clear that (1)
still holds. Concerning (2), we haveM′ = M∪{{m′}k1···kn}, m′ may only
containing keys with a level strictly lesser than Max, and k1, . . . , kn are re-
vocation keys. Let k ∈ U MaxE′ \L ′, i.e. k ∈ U MaxE \L , with Level(k) = Max
and m ∈M′ such that k ∈ St(m). If m ∈M, we use the fact that E veri-
fies (2) and conclude, if m = {m′}k1···kn , then, according to the structure
of m′ it must be the case where k = ki for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and it also
satisfies (2).
• If E −→ E′. Let us consider three subcases :
– The transition corresponds to the generationPublic, generationSecret
or decrypt command. Then, handles containing revocation keys are
not modified and (1) is invariant. Moreover, there is no output con-
taining revocation keys, so (2) is also invariant.
– The transition corresponds to the encrypt command. Such a tran-
sition does not affect handles containing revocation keys and (1) is
trivially verified. Moreover, we have M′ = M ∪ {m} with m =
{U1, . . . , UN}k and Ui may only contain a key of a level strictly less
than Max. Moreover k can not be a revocation key according to the
specification and then, (2) holds.
– The transition corresponds to the blacklist, create, update, revoke or
updateMax command. Such a transition would implies that the at-
tacker is capable to perform an admin command, i.e. is able to forge
a message with NMax revocation keys for a given TRD which is in
contradiction with Hypothesis 1 and Lemma 2.
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We can now prove the Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let E be a global state such that E∅ −→∗ E, then :
∀k ∈ V MaxE \L , E 6` k.
Proof. According to the Definition 3, we have that E∅ clearly satisfies properties
(1) and (2) of Proposition 3. Using the result of that proposition, we know that
E verifies these properties too. Let us consider k ∈ V MaxE \ L , then we have
that k ∈ U MaxE \L . The Lemma 2 allows us to conclude that M 6` k, that is
E 6` k.
B Proving Proposition 1
We show that good keys are never deducible by an attacker. More precisely, we
show that the property of robustness is preserved under deduction.
Lemma 3. The properties defined in Definition 5 are invariant under deduction.
Proof. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state robust up to Lv and L . We
consider E′ another global state such that E
(DED)−−−−→ E′ and we prove that E′
verifies properties (1), (2) and (3). To do so, we show that if E verifies (1), (2)
and (3) for Lv and L , then Ep = (P, I,Mp, N,K, t) where Mp = M∪ {p} with
M ` p in one step also verifies (1), (2) and (3) for Lv and L . We can then
conclude by induction.
(1) Let (l, v,m) be attributes of k in Ep and let us show that they must be
attributes of k in E already.
• If (l, v,m) are attributes of k by case (a) in Ep, then, since the tran-
sition does not affect handles, we must have that (l, v,m) were at-
tributes of k by case (a) already in E.
• If (l, v,m) are attributes of k by case (b) in Ep, we know that ∃ q ∈ K,
m ∈Mp s.t. Max ∈ Level(q) and {cmd, . . . , k, l2, v2,m2, . . . }q1···qjq ∈
St(m) with Max ∈ Level(qi). We consider two subcases:
– If m ∈M, then (l, v,m) were already attributes of k in E.
– If m = p. Then we have two sub-subcases:
∗ The deduction rule is a decomposition rule or the rule
m ∈M
M ` m .
Then, we have that m ∈ St(M) and we can conclude as in
the previous case.
∗ The deduction rule is a composition rule. If the rule
x ∈M y ∈M
M ` 〈x, y〉
is applied, then {cmd, . . . , k, l2, v2,m2, . . . }q1···qjq must be
subterm of either x or y and we can conclude. If the rule is
x ∈M y ∈M
M ` {x}y , then we have two possibilities :
? {cmd, . . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q1···qjq is subterm of x ∈M and we
conclude.
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? m = {cmd, . . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q1···qjq and then we have y =
q and x = {cmd, . . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q1···qj . In that case, we
must have j ≥ 1 since j = 0 would lead to a contradiction
in E. Indeed, we would have k ∈ GLv(Ep,L ), i.e. k ∈ G
Lv
(E,L )
s.t. ∃ m ∈M with an occurrence of k not satisfying (2) in
E. Thus, j ≥ 1. Then, using induction hypothesis over x,
we know that (l, v,m) were already attributes of k in E.
• If (l, v,m) are attributes of k by case (c) in Ep, we know that ∃ q ∈ K,
m ∈Mp s.t. {. . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q ∈ St(m). We have two subcases:
– If m ∈M, then (l, v,m) were already attributes of k in E.
– If m = p. Then we have two sub-subcases:
∗ The deduction rule is a decomposition rule or the rule
m ∈M
M ` m .
Then, we have that m ∈ St(M) and we can conclude as in
the previous case.
∗ The deduction rule is a composition rule. If the rule
x ∈M y ∈M
M ` 〈x, y〉
is applied, then {. . . , k, l2, v2,m2, . . . }q must be subterm of
either x or y and we can conclude. If the rule is
x ∈M y ∈M
M ` {x}y ,
then we have two possibilities :
? {. . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q1···qjq is subterm of x ∈M and we con-
clude.
? m = {. . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q and then we have y = q and
x = {. . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }. But, since x ∈ M and k ∈ GLvE ,
this is a contradiction since x does not satisfy (2).
(2) Let k ∈ GLv(Ep,L ), m ∈Mp s.t. k ∈ St(m). If m ∈M, we the use induction
hypothesis and we can conclude easily. Now we consider m = p. We
consider different cases according to the applied deduction rule :
• If the rule is
M ` m , then the result is obvious.
• If the rule is
m1 ∈M m2 ∈M
M ` 〈m1,m2〉 , then since k occurs in m = 〈m1,m2〉,
k occurs in m1 or/and m2. Since m1,m2 ∈ M, using the induction
hypothesis, we know that m1 and m2 are verifying (2), thus, it is
clear that m also verifies (2).
• If the rule is
〈m1,m2〉 ∈M
M ` mi , then since m is a subterm of a term
already verifying (2) using the induction hypothesis, we obviously
have that m verifies (2).
• If the rule is
x ∈M y ∈M
M ` {x}y , then as k occurs in m = {x}y, k may
occur in x or/and y. If y = k (k occurs in y), we have that k ∈ M,
which contradicts (2). Then k can only occurs in x and since x ∈M,
using the induction hypothesis, we have that x, and by extension, m
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satisfies (2).
• If the rule is
{x}y ∈M y ∈M
M ` x , then k occurring in m = x implies
that k occurs in {x}y. Since {x}y ∈M, using the induction hypoth-
esis, we know that it verifies (2). Moreover, since y ∈ M we have
that y = k leads to a contradiction with (2) in E. We consider three
subcases:
– In the first subcase, k appears in key position in {x}y and as we
have just seen it, it can not be the case y = k, then ∃ m′ s.t.
{m′}k occurs in x. In that case, this occurrence of k in x still
satisfies (2.i).
– In the second subcase, we have {. . . , k, . . . }k′ ∈ St({x}y) with
k′ ∈ K s.t. vk ≤ vk′ + δ(l) with l = Level(k) < Level(k′)
and Max /∈ Level(k′) (k appears in {x}y according to (2.ii)).
If {. . . , k, . . . }k′ ∈ St(x) we can conclude easily, the most com-
plicated case is when {. . . , k, . . . }k′ = {x}y. In that case, since
vk ≤ vk′ + δ(l) and k ∈ UEp , we have that k′ ∈ UEp , indeed, if
we consider l′ = max(Level(k′)), we have:
vk′ + ∆(l
′) = vk′ + δ(l)− δ(l) + ∆(l′),
≥ vk + ∆(l′)− δ(l),
≥ vk + ∆(l), since l < l′
> t.
Now, with k ∈ GLv(Ep,L ) and that k′ ∈ UEp , we have that k′ /∈ L
otherwise, using property (3), there would be some level l′ in Lv
corresponding to k′ and since Level(k) < Level(k′), k would not
be in GLv(Ep,L ). Using this fact and that Level(k) < Level(k′) we
also have that @ i, j s.t. li < lj with li ∈ Level(k′) and lj ∈ Lv.
Thus, we have that k′ ∈ GLv(Ep,L ), especially k′ ∈ G
Lv
(E,L ) (the
transition does not affect time or the set of lost keys). Then,
y = k′ would implies that k′ ∈M which is a contradiction with
(2).
– In the third subcase, we have {. . . , k, . . . }q1···qnk′ ∈ St({x}y) with
q1, . . . , qn, k
′ ∈ K s.t., for i ∈ [1, n], Max ∈ Level(qi), k′ /∈ L ,
Max ∈ Level(k′) and vk ≤ vk′ + δ(l) with l = Level(k) (The
occurrence of k is of the form (2.iii)). As always if the whole
occurrence is included in x, the conclusion is easy. We consider
the worst case where there is the equality. Using the argument
above on validities, we know that k′ ∈ UEp , i.e. in UE , and since
it is not lost and that Max ∈ Level(k′), we have that k′ ∈ GLv(E,L ).
Then, using Lemma 2, we know that E 6` k′ and then that y = k′
leads to a contradiction.
(3) Since L ′ = L and UE = UE′ , we have that {l | ∃k ∈ L ∩ UE s.t. l ∈
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Level(k)} = {l | ∃k ∈ L ′ ∩UE′ s.t. l ∈ Level(k)} and (3) holds obviously
with the same Lv.
We can now easily prove Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) be a global state, L a set of keys
(typically lost keys), and k ∈ K. Let Lv be a set of levels. Assume that E is
robust up to Lv and L then:
∀k ∈ GLv(E,L ) M 6` k.
Proof. Let us consider that ∃ k ∈ GLv(E,L ) such that E ` k, i.e. M ` k. According
to this, ∃ E′ a global state such that E (DED)−−−−→ E′ where M′ = M ∪ {k}. Since
E is robust up to Lv and L , using Lemma 3, we know that E′ is robust up to Lv
and L . But k ∈ GLv(E,L ) implies k ∈ GLv(E′,L ) and since k ∈M′, then E′ cannot
satisfies (2). Contradiction.
C Proving Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Let E be a global state such that E∅ −→∗ E and let L be the set
of keys lost along the execution E∅ −→∗ E. Then E is robust up to Lv = {l |
∃ Lost(k) ∈ L and Level(k) = l} and L .
The proof of this theorem by induction. The initial case is obvious and the
general case is proved by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let us consider global states E = (P, I, M, N,K, t) and E′ =
(P ′, I ′,M′, N ′,K ′, t′) such that E∅ −→∗ E L−−→ E′. We suppose that E is robust
up to Lv = {l | ∃ Lost(k) ∈ L and Level(k) = l} and L . If L 6= Lost(k), then
E′ is robust up to Lv and L , otherwise E′ is robust up to L′v = Lv ∪ Level(k).
Proof. We will show that (1), (2) and (3) are invariant under application of
transition rules :
• If E
(DED)−−−−−→ E′. This step is already proven in Lemma 3.
• If E
(TIM)−−−−−→ E′. During this transition, only some latent keys may become
dead since tE′ > tE . In that case, we have GLv(E′,L ) ⊆ GLv(E,L ), moreover, by
inspection, we have that existential quantifications over keys of properties
(1) and (2) are stable by time passing. (Time does not turn non lost keys
into lost keys.) Thus, we conclude using the induction hypothesis on E.
Finally, since we may only have {l | ∃k ∈ L ∩UE s.t. l ∈ Level(k)} ⊇ {l |
∃k ∈ L ∩UE′ s.t. l ∈ Level(k)}, (3) holds obviously.
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• If E
(LST)−−−−−→ E′. Then, we consider L′v = Lv ∪ Level(k) and L ′ = L ∪ {k}
with k the key lost during the transition. Considering this, we have that
GL′v(E′,L ′) ⊆ GLv(E,L ) and, since, by inspection, existential quantifications
over keys in property (1) are stable under the lost transition, using the
induction hypothesis on E, (1) holds easily.
For property (2), There are two issues. The first one concerns the case
where k1 ∈ GLv(E,L ) s.t. we have {. . . , k1, . . . }k ∈ St(M) with k ∈ K and
Level(k1) = l1 < Level(k), Max /∈ Level(k) and vk1 ≤ vk + δ(l1). But since
we lost k during the transition, then k1 is no more in GL
′
v
(E′,L ′) and then
there is nothing to verify. The second problem appears when we have
k1 ∈ GLv(E,L ) s.t. {. . . , k1, . . . }q1···qnk ∈ St(M) with q1, . . . , qn, k ∈ K s.t.,
for i ∈ [1, n], Max ∈ Level(qi), k /∈ L , Max ∈ Level(k′) and vk1 ≤ vk + δl1
with l1 = Level(k1). Even if we lose k during the transition, we may have
that k1 remains in GL
′
v
(E′,L ′). Let us suppose that, then, using the last
inequality, we have :
vk1 + ∆(l1) ≤ vk + δ(l1) + ∆(l1),
≤ vk + ∆(Max), since l1 < Max ∈ Level(k′).
This shows that k ∈ UE′ (i.e. in UE) since, if it is not, then vk+∆(Max) ≤
t which implies vk1 + ∆(Max) ≤ t and, especially, that k1 is dead imply-
ing a contradiction with the fact that k1 ∈ GLv(E′,L ′). Moreover, since
k /∈ L in E, we know that k was in GLv(E,L ) and, using Lemma 2, we
have that E 6` k. Let m ∈ M containing the occurrence of k1 we focus
on. Then, we have two possibilities : m is an admin message or m was
deduced by the intruder. In the second case, we have that ∃ m′ ∈ M an
admin message such that {m′, t1, . . . , tn} ` m with t1, . . . , tn ∈ M and
{. . . , k1, . . . }q1···qnk ∈ St(m′). Otherwise, it would implies that the in-
truder forged m containing an undeducible revocation key without any
admin message, which is impossible. Then, in both cases, we have that
∃ m ∈M an admin message s.t. {. . . , k1, . . . }q1···qnk ∈ St(m). We distin-
guish three subcases :
– If we have n > NMax − 1, we have a term with more than NMax re-
vocation keys subterm of a admin message which is in contradiction
with Hypothesis 2 since the specification requires NMax revocation
keys, no more.
– If we have n = NMax − 1, then m = {. . . , k, . . . }q1···qnk. Suppose
that ∀i ∈ [1, n], qi ∈ L . Then, if no keys are dead, we have NMax
latent revocation keys lost, which is a contradiction to Hypothesis 1,
since all these revocation keys belong to one TRD. Then, one key is
dead. If k is dead, we already saw that k1 is dead too and we have a
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contradiction. If ∃ j ∈ [1, n] such that qj is dead, we have :
vk1 + ∆(l1) = vk1 − vqj + vqj + ∆(l1),
≤ δ(l1) + vqj + ∆(l1),
≤ vqj + ∆(Max),
≤ t.
Indeed, we have vk1 − vqj ≤ δ(l1) since at the time of emission of the
message, time te, we know that vk1 ≤ te + δ(l1) and that te < vqj
since qj was necessarily valid. Thus, in that case, we also have a
contradiction on k1, then, we must have that ∃ i ∈ [1, n] such that
qi /∈ L . Moreover, we have that vk1 ≤ vqj + δ(l1) using the two
previous inequalities. Then, we show that the occurrence of k1 still
verifying (2.iii) after the loss of k.
– If n < NMax− 1. We have m = {. . . , k, . . . }q1···qnk′q′1···q′p with n+ p =
NMax − 1 and ∀i ∈ [1, p], Level(q′i) = Max and E ` q′i for i ∈ [1, p].
({. . . , k, . . . }q1···qnk′ is deduced from m, then it implies that the keys
’protecting’ this term were deducible otherwise there will be a con-
tradiction.) This implies, for each i ∈ [1, p] that either q′i ∈ L or q′i
is dead. If q′i is dead, we prove, using the argument with the inequal-
ities above, that k1 is dead, which is a contradiction with the fact
that k1 ∈ GL
′
v
(E′,L ′), thus, we have that ∀i ∈ [1, p], q′i ∈ L . Now, we
can apply the previous case (n = NMax − 1) to m in order to prove
that ∃ i ∈ [1, n] s.t. qi /∈ L and vk1 ≤ vqi + δ(l1). Thus, we show
that the occurrence of k1 still verifying (2.iii).
For property (3), {l | ∃k ∈ L ′ ∩ UE′ s.t. l ∈ Level(k)} = {l | ∃k ∈
L ∩ UE s.t. l ∈ Level(k)} ∪ Level(k) and since L′v = Lv ∪ Level(k) and
Lv ≥s {l | ∃k ∈ L ∩UE s.t. l ∈ Level(k)}, (3) holds.
• If E
(UPM)−−−−−→ E′. This transition only affects handles containing revo-
cation keys, implying that we have GLv(E′,L ′) = GLv(E,L ) and, according to
the semantic, we also have M′ = M. Moreover, by inspection and using
hypothesis 2 on admin commands, we have that existential quantifications
over keys of properties (1) and (2) are stable by these transitions. Then,
it is clear, that, using the induction hypothesis on E, we have that (1)
and (2) holds for E′. Finally, since L = L ′, (3) holds obviously.
• If E
(RVK)−−−−−→ E′. In this case, we remove a certain number of handles
(keys) from a TRD and we have that M′ = M ∪ {m} where m does not
contain key values. Then, using the induction hypothesis, we have that
(1) and (2) holds. Finally, since L = L ′, (3) holds obviously.
• If E
(BLK)−−−−−→ E′. In this case, we remove a certain number of handles
(keys) from a TRD and we have that M′ = M ∪ {m} where m contains
no key values, i.e. ∀k ∈ GLv(E′,L ′) s.t. k /∈ St(m). Considering this, and the
induction hypothesis, it is obvious that (1) and (2) holds for E′. Finally,
since L = L ′, (3) holds obviously.
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• If E L−−→ E′ with L ∈ {(NEW),(UPD)}. In this case, we have GLv(E′,L ′) ⊇
GLvE andM′ = M∪{m} where m = {m′}q1···qr with q1, . . . , qr valid revoca-
tion keys for the concerned TRD, and then, using Hypothesis 1, ∃ j ∈ [1, r]
s.t. qr /∈ L ′.
(1) Let k ∈ GLv(E′,L ′). If k appears in m with no attributes (in the case
where k will be updated by the command), then, using the induction
hypothesis is enough to conclude. If k appears with attributes (then
it is the new key created or updated by the command), then let us
consider two cases :
– Either k has never occurred before in M (in the commands that
have been previously executed), then (1) holds obviously.
– Or k has occurred before in M. Then, during the evolution
E∅ −→∗ E, we consider the increasing sequence of history (Mi)i
and consider the first one such that k does not appear in Mi−1
and k appears in Mi. To set a fixed lower level key in a TRD,
there are three ways : a create, update or decrypt command. Since
the two first commands require NMax valid revocation keys, if k
appears with such a command, this one must have been done by
the administrator according to Hypothesis 1 and Lemma 2. The
use of a decrypt command implies that the command comes from
the intruder (an administrator will not use this way to put k in
a TRD) but this would be in contradiction with the fact that
k ∈ GLv(E′,L ′) since k would be lost from the start. Thus k was
set up by an admin command m′, and, using the Hypothesis 2,
we know that the attributes associated to k in m are the same to
those which are associated to k in m′. Now, using the induction
hypothesis in E, we know that all previous attributes associated
to k are the same as those in m′, which are the same as those in
the new handle and m. Thus, (1) holds.
(2) Let k ∈ GLv(E′,L ′) s.t. ∃ m′ ∈ M′ s.t. k ∈ St(m′). We have the same
discussion as is the previous transition : there is at least one revoca-
tion key q which is not lost in m and we must have vk ≤ vq + δ(l)
where l = Level(k). Then, (2) holds.
(3) Finally, since L = L ′, (3) holds obviously.
• If E −→ E′. Let us consider four subcases :
– The transition corresponds to the generatePublic or generateSecret
command. For the first one, only information of level 0 is created
and then properties hold obviously. The generateSecret command
creates fresh keys, thus (1) holds and since M′ = M we have also
that (2) holds. Finally, since L = L ′, (3) holds obviously.
– The transition corresponds to the blacklist, create, update, revoke or
updateMax command. This implies that the intruder may forge an
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admin message, and, therefore, can know NMax different and valid
revocation keys for the API, which is not possible according to Hy-
pothesis 1 and the Theorem 1. Finally, since L = L ′, (3) holds
obviously.
– The transition corresponds to the encrypt command. For property
(1), the command only uses handles, or information of level 0, al-
ready existing, then, using induction hypothesis on E, we can con-
clude that the property holds. For property (2), we have that M′ =
M∪{{U1, . . . , Un}k} with Ui a level 0 message or a (ki, li, vi,mi) set
with 1 ≤ li < Max. Suppose that ∃ i ∈ [1, n] s.t. ki ∈ GLv(E′,L ′), then,
according to the specification, we have that Level(ki) < Level(k),
Max /∈ Level(k) and vk > t, vki > t. Thus, we must have vki ≤
vk + δ(li) otherwise, we have vki > vk + δ(li) > t + δ(li) which is
impossible. Indeed, let us consider the first apparition, as in a pre-
vious case, of ki in the system. We have that ki appeared from a
create, update, decrypt or generateSecret command. But, whatever
the applied command, the TRD does a test on validity (or sets it
itself) such that vki ≤ tc + δ(li) where tc is the time of the state
where ki appears for the first time. Since t+δ(li) > tc+δ(li), having
vki > vk + δ(li) leads to a contradiction. Then (2) holds. Finally,
since we still have L = L ′, (3) holds obviously.
– The transition corresponds to the decrypt command. We have that
M′ does not contain information of a level greater or equal to 1.
Moreover, we add a key in the API concerned by the decrypt com-
mand and GLv(E′,L ′) may be larger than GLv(E,L ). Let us consider
k, q ∈ K ′ s.t. (decrypt, {. . . , k, l, v,m, . . . }q, hq, where hq is the han-
dle pointing to q in the TRD, is the message implying the considered
decrypt command. Suppose that k ∈ GLv(E′,L ′) \ GLv(E,L ). Then, the
message is coming from the intruder, otherwise, k should already ap-
pear in a handle of another TRD and we should have k ∈ GLv(E,L ).
Since the message comes from the intruder, it implies that E ` q.
Using Proposition 1, we must have that q /∈ GLv(E,L ). But we know
that the message was accepted by the TRD, then, q must be valid
(and then latent), then, if q /∈ GLv(E,L ), we must have that q ∈ L
or ∃ q′ ∈ K ∩L and Level(q) ≤ Level(q′). Adding the fact that we
must have Level(k) < Level(q), we must have k /∈ GLv(E′,L ′) which is a
contradiction. Thus, k was already in GLv(E,L ) and GLv(E′,L ′) = GLv(E,L )
which, using the induction hypothesis, implies that E′ verifies (2).
For property (1), we consider two cases :
∗ If k, the key used to decrypt, is in GLv(E,L ). Then, we know, us-
ing Proposition 1, that E 6` k. Thus, the message was already
existing in M and verifies property (1) by induction hypothesis.
∗ If k, the key used to decrypt, is not in GLv(E,L ). Then, it must
be the case that k ∈ L or k is under a lost key (and may be
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considered as lost.) since it must be valid (then, a fortiori, la-
tent). Since all keys q in the encrypted message must verify
Level(q) < Level(k), then, q /∈ GLv(E,L ), i.e. q /∈ GLv(E′,L ′) and then
does not interfere with property (1).
Finally, since L = L ′, (3) holds obviously.
D Retrieving higher security levels
We show that higher security levels are guaranteed either when some time
elapses (Theorem 3) or when a compromised key is blacklisted (Theorem 4).
Theorem 3. Let E,E′ be two global states such that
E∅ −→∗ E −→∗ E′. Assume that E is robust up to Lv and L and let l ∈ Lv
be a compromised level. Let L ′ be the set of keys lost along the execution
E −→∗ E′. We further assume that there has been no ‘lost’ event for keys of
level greater than l, that is, there is no k ∈ L ′ such that Level(k) ≥ l. Let
v = sup({vk | k ∈ L and Level(k) = l}), where vk is the validity time associated
to k (Theorem 2 ensures vk is unique). Then:
t′ ≥ v + ∆(l) =⇒ E′′ is robust up to L′′v for L ′′,
where t′ is the global time of E′ and E′′ is such that E′
Lost(A)−−−−→ E′′ with A =
{k | Level(k) = l′ with l′ < l} and L′′v = (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k)) \ {l} where
L ′′ = L ′ ∪A.
Proof. We know, using Theorem 2, that E′ is robust up to L′v = Lv∪
⋃
k∈L ′ Level(k)
and L ′. Using Theorem 2 again, we have that E′′ is robust up to L = L′v ∪{l′ |
l′ < l} = Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k) and L
′′ = L ′ ∪A.
Now, if we consider L
′′
v = (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k)) \ {l} = L \ {l}, we have that
GL(E′′,L ′′) = GL
′′
v
(E′′,L ′′). Indeed, we have:
GL(E′′,L ′′) = {k | Max /∈ Level(k), k ∈ UE′′ \L ′′,
∃l′ ∈ Level(k) s.t. l′ 6< L}
= {k | Max /∈ Level(k), k ∈ UE′′ \L ′′,
∃l′ ∈ Level(k) s.t. l′ 6< L′′v }
\ {k | Max /∈ Level(k), k ∈ UE′′ \L ′′,
∃l′ ∈ Level(k) s.t. l′ < l}
= GL
′′
v
(E′′,L ′′) \G,
where G = {k | Max /∈ Level(k), k ∈ UE′′ \L ′′,∃l′ ∈ Level(k) s.t. l′ < l}.
But, in E′′, ∀k s.t. l′ ∈ Level(k) with l′ < l, then k ∈ L ′′. Then, G = ∅.
Thus, we have that E′′ verifies (1) and (2) for L
′′
v .
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Moreover, we know that ∀k ∈ L ′′ s.t. Level(k) = l, then k /∈ UE′′ , according
to this, we have L
′′
v ≥s {li | ki ∈ L ′′∩UE′′ where li = Level(ki)}) using the fact
above and the construction of L
′′
v . Thus E′′ also ensures (3) for L
′′
v and E′′ is
robust up to L
′′
v for L ′′.
Theorem 4. Let E = (P, I,M, N,K, t) a be a global state s.t. E∅ −→∗ E. Let
L be a set of (lost) keys. Assume that a ∈ P is locally robust up to Lv and L
in E. Assume that E L−−→−→∗ E′ with L a blacklist command for TRD a, level
l, and validity time th (with th greater or equal to vh = sup({vk | k ∈ L and l ∈
Level(k)}). Let L ′ be the set of keys lost along the execution E L−−→−→∗ E′.
We further assume that there has been no lost event for keys of level greater
than l, that is, there is no k ∈ L ′ such that Level(k) ≥ l.
Then a is locally robust up to L
′′
v = (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k)) \ {l} in E′′ where
E′′ is such that E′
Lost(A)−−−−→ E′′ with A = {k | Level(k) = l′ with l′ < l} and
L ′′ = L ′ ∪A.
Proof. When the blacklist command is performed, we know, according to the
specification, that a is robust up to (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L Level(k)) \ {l′ | l′ ≤ l} and L
(in the state EL such that E
L−−→ EL −→∗ E′). Then, if t′, the current time of
global state E′ is smaller than th, then, since the TRD a is blocked under level
l, it is clear that it is robust up to (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′ Level(k)) \ {l′ | l′ ≤ l} and L ′ in
E′, and, robust up to (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k)) \ {l} and L ′′ in E′′. (In fact it is
even robust to a greater set of levels before the end of the effect of the blacklist.)
If t′ > th, then, according to the hypothesis on th, we can use the Theorem
3 to prove that E′′ itself is robust up to L
′′
v = (Lv ∪
⋃
k∈L ′′ Level(k)) \ {l} and
L ′′, implying immediately that a is robust up to L
′′
v and L ′′ in E′′.
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